Fix the security audit's findings

ShareDownload::$authenticated was a public property without #[Locked],
so a visitor with a share's link but not its password could set it from
the browser and see the file list: names, folder paths, sizes and
whether the share holds a text. The contents stayed protected; the flag
is now locked, and a test tries to set it.

Sessions hold the keys of the password shares a recipient unlocked, and
were stored unencrypted in the sessions table wherever SESSION_ENCRYPT
was not set, which includes every Docker install. They are now
encrypted unless SESSION_ENCRYPT=false. Share keys never live in the
session, so every share stays readable; people sign in again once.

The container generated an APP_KEY when none was set, printed it to the
logs and generated another on the next start, which left the shares
without a password unreadable. It now refuses to start without one and
says how to create it; docker-compose.example.yml requires it for both
services. The command it names, and the README's, now pass
--entrypoint php: the image's entrypoint ignores its arguments, so
"docker run <image> php artisan key:generate --show" never ran it.

Every proxy is trusted, so the password-reset mail built its link from
a host a forged X-Forwarded-Host could choose. It is now built from
APP_URL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ curl -O https://gitea.nonameweb.ch/noNameWEB/SealShare/raw/branch/main/docker-co
 cp docker-compose.example.yml docker-compose.yml
 
 # Generate an app key and paste it into docker-compose.yml
-docker run --rm gitea.nonameweb.ch/nonameweb/sealshare:latest php artisan key:generate --show
+docker run --rm --entrypoint php gitea.nonameweb.ch/nonameweb/sealshare:latest artisan key:generate --show
 
 # Edit docker-compose.yml — set APP_KEY and APP_URL, and choose how HTTPS is served (below)
 # Then start:

app/Livewire/ShareDownload.php

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use App\Services\ShareService;
 use Carbon\CarbonInterval;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\RateLimiter;
 use Livewire\Attributes\Layout;
+use Livewire\Attributes\Locked;
 use Livewire\Attributes\Renderless;
 use Livewire\Attributes\Validate;
 use Livewire\Component;
@@ -16,6 +17,8 @@ class ShareDownload extends Component
 {
     public Share $share;
 
+    /** Set only by mount() and verifyPassword(): the browser must never unlock the file list. */
+    #[Locked]
     public bool $authenticated = false;
 
     #[Validate('required|string')]

app/Providers/FortifyServiceProvider.php

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
 namespace App\Providers;
 
 use App\Actions\Fortify\ResetUserPassword;
+use App\Models\User;
+use Illuminate\Auth\Notifications\ResetPassword;
 use Illuminate\Cache\RateLimiting\Limit;
 use Illuminate\Http\Request;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\RateLimiter;
@@ -28,6 +30,12 @@ class FortifyServiceProvider extends ServiceProvider
     private function configureActions(): void
     {
         Fortify::resetUserPasswordsUsing(ResetUserPassword::class);
+
+        // From APP_URL, never the request's host: every proxy is trusted, so a forged X-Forwarded-Host would otherwise pick it.
+        ResetPassword::createUrlUsing(fn (User $user, string $token): string => rtrim((string) config('app.url'), '/').route('password.reset', [
+            'token' => $token,
+            'email' => $user->getEmailForPasswordReset(),
+        ], false));
     }
 
     /**

config/session.php

@@ -8,13 +8,19 @@ use Illuminate\Support\Str;
 |--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 |
 | Kept from earlier releases, where it differs from the framework's
-| "<app>_session": renaming the cookie would sign everyone out. Every
+| "<app>_session": renaming the cookie would sign everyone out.
-| other key comes from the framework's defaults.
+|
+| Sessions are encrypted unless SESSION_ENCRYPT=false: they hold the keys
+| of the password shares a recipient unlocked, which must never sit
+| readable in the sessions table. Every other key comes from the
+| framework's defaults.
 |
 */
 
 return [
 
+    'encrypt' => env('SESSION_ENCRYPT', true),
+
     'cookie' => env(
         'SESSION_COOKIE',
         Str::slug((string) env('APP_NAME', 'laravel')).'-session'

docker-compose.example.yml

@@ -4,12 +4,13 @@
 #
 # Quick start:
 #   1. Copy this file:  cp docker-compose.example.yml docker-compose.yml
-#   2. Edit the settings below (APP_URL is required; uploads need HTTPS, see below)
+#   2. Edit the settings below (APP_URL and APP_KEY are required; uploads need HTTPS, see below)
 #   3. Start:  docker compose up -d
 #   4. Open your browser to your configured domain
 #
-# Note: APP_KEY is auto-generated on first start if not set.
+# APP_KEY is required: the container does not start without it. Create one with
-#       Copy it from the logs into your docker-compose.yml to persist across restarts.
+#   docker run --rm --entrypoint php gitea.nonameweb.ch/nonameweb/sealshare:latest artisan key:generate --show
+# and keep it: it decrypts the shares, so a new key makes the existing ones unreadable.
 #
 # ============================================
 
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ services:
     environment:
       # --- REQUIRED ---
       APP_URL:              # Your full URL, e.g. https://share.example.com
-      # APP_KEY:            # Auto-generated if not set. Copy from logs to persist across restarts.
+      APP_KEY:              # Required. Create one with php artisan key:generate --show (see above)
       DB_DATABASE: /app/database/sqlite/database.sqlite  # The SQLite file in sealshare_database
 
       # --- HTTPS ---
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ services:
       - sealshare_storage:/app/storage/app
       - sealshare_database:/app/database/sqlite
     environment:
-      # APP_KEY:            # Same key as the app service above (auto-generated if not set)
+      APP_KEY:              # Same key as the app service above
       APP_URL:              # Same URL as the app service above
       DB_DATABASE: /app/database/sqlite/database.sqlite  # Same as the app service above
     depends_on:

docker/entrypoint.sh

@@ -3,13 +3,14 @@ set -e
 
 cd /app
 
-# Auto-generate APP_KEY if not provided
+# APP_KEY decrypts the shares, so it must stay the same across restarts: a key made up here would
+# change on the next start and leave every existing share unreadable.
 if [ -z "$APP_KEY" ]; then
-    echo "[entrypoint] No APP_KEY set, generating one..."
+    echo "[entrypoint] APP_KEY is not set. Create one and set it for the app and the scheduler:" >&2
-    APP_KEY=$(php artisan key:generate --show)
+    echo "[entrypoint]   docker run --rm --entrypoint php <this image> artisan key:generate --show" >&2
-    export APP_KEY
+    echo "[entrypoint] If this install ran without one before, use the key from its old logs" >&2
-    echo "[entrypoint] Generated APP_KEY: $APP_KEY"
+    echo "[entrypoint] (\"Generated APP_KEY: ...\") so its shares stay readable." >&2
-    echo "[entrypoint] WARNING: Set this APP_KEY in your docker-compose.yml to persist across restarts!"
+    exit 1
 fi
 
 # A docker-compose.yml from before 2.1.1 mounts the SQLite volume over all of /app/database, so the

tests/Feature/Auth/PasswordResetTest.php

@@ -20,6 +20,20 @@ test('reset password link can be requested', function () {
     Notification::assertSentTo($user, ResetPassword::class);
 });
 
+test('the reset link points at APP_URL, whatever host the request claims', function () {
+    Notification::fake();
+    config(['app.url' => 'https://share.example.com']);
+
+    $user = User::factory()->create();
+
+    $this->withHeader('X-Forwarded-Host', 'attacker.example')
+        ->post(route('password.request'), ['email' => $user->email]);
+
+    Notification::assertSentTo($user, ResetPassword::class, function (ResetPassword $notification) use ($user) {
+        return str_starts_with($notification->toMail($user)->actionUrl, 'https://share.example.com/reset-password/');
+    });
+});
+
 test('reset password screen can be rendered', function () {
     Notification::fake();
 

tests/Feature/SecurityAuditTest.php

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use App\Services\ShareService;
 use Illuminate\Http\UploadedFile;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\RateLimiter;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Storage;
+use Livewire\Features\SupportLockedProperties\CannotUpdateLockedPropertyException;
 use Livewire\Livewire;
 
 // --- Session stores derived key, not plaintext password ---
@@ -35,6 +36,22 @@ test('session stores derived encryption key instead of plaintext password', func
     expect(strlen(session('share_key_'.$share->token)))->toBe(64);
 });
 
+// --- The password gate cannot be opened from the browser ---
+
+test('a visitor without the password cannot unlock a share\'s file list from the browser', function () {
+    Storage::fake('shares');
+
+    $share = app(ShareService::class)->createShare([
+        ['file' => UploadedFile::fake()->createWithContent('salary-review.pdf', 'secret'), 'relativePath' => null],
+    ], [
+        'password' => 'test-password-secure',
+    ]);
+
+    Livewire::test(ShareDownload::class, ['share' => $share])
+        ->assertDontSee('salary-review.pdf')
+        ->set('authenticated', true);
+})->throws(CannotUpdateLockedPropertyException::class);
+
 // --- Rate limiting on password verification ---
 
 test('rate limiting blocks after 5 failed password attempts', function () {