Files
SealShare/app/Providers/FortifyServiceProvider.php
T
Andreas Reinhold / reiniandClaude Opus 5.5 6578335568 Fix the security audit's findings
ShareDownload::$authenticated was a public property without #[Locked],
so a visitor with a share's link but not its password could set it from
the browser and see the file list: names, folder paths, sizes and
whether the share holds a text. The contents stayed protected; the flag
is now locked, and a test tries to set it.

Sessions hold the keys of the password shares a recipient unlocked, and
were stored unencrypted in the sessions table wherever SESSION_ENCRYPT
was not set, which includes every Docker install. They are now
encrypted unless SESSION_ENCRYPT=false. Share keys never live in the
session, so every share stays readable; people sign in again once.

The container generated an APP_KEY when none was set, printed it to the
logs and generated another on the next start, which left the shares
without a password unreadable. It now refuses to start without one and
says how to create it; docker-compose.example.yml requires it for both
services. The command it names, and the README's, now pass
--entrypoint php: the image's entrypoint ignores its arguments, so
"docker run <image> php artisan key:generate --show" never ran it.

Every proxy is trusted, so the password-reset mail built its link from
a host a forged X-Forwarded-Host could choose. It is now built from
APP_URL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 23:23:00 +02:00

69 lines
2.2 KiB
PHP

<?php
namespace App\Providers;
use App\Actions\Fortify\ResetUserPassword;
use App\Models\User;
use Illuminate\Auth\Notifications\ResetPassword;
use Illuminate\Cache\RateLimiting\Limit;
use Illuminate\Http\Request;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\RateLimiter;
use Illuminate\Support\ServiceProvider;
use Illuminate\Support\Str;
use Laravel\Fortify\Fortify;
class FortifyServiceProvider extends ServiceProvider
{
/**
* Bootstrap any application services.
*/
public function boot(): void
{
$this->configureActions();
$this->configureViews();
$this->configureRateLimiting();
}
/**
* Configure Fortify actions.
*/
private function configureActions(): void
{
Fortify::resetUserPasswordsUsing(ResetUserPassword::class);
// From APP_URL, never the request's host: every proxy is trusted, so a forged X-Forwarded-Host would otherwise pick it.
ResetPassword::createUrlUsing(fn (User $user, string $token): string => rtrim((string) config('app.url'), '/').route('password.reset', [
'token' => $token,
'email' => $user->getEmailForPasswordReset(),
], false));
}
/**
* Configure Fortify views.
*/
private function configureViews(): void
{
Fortify::loginView(fn () => view('pages::auth.login'));
Fortify::twoFactorChallengeView(fn () => view('pages::auth.two-factor-challenge'));
Fortify::confirmPasswordView(fn () => view('pages::auth.confirm-password'));
Fortify::resetPasswordView(fn () => view('pages::auth.reset-password'));
Fortify::requestPasswordResetLinkView(fn () => view('pages::auth.forgot-password'));
}
/**
* Configure rate limiting.
*/
private function configureRateLimiting(): void
{
RateLimiter::for('two-factor', function (Request $request) {
return Limit::perMinute(5)->by($request->session()->get('login.id'));
});
RateLimiter::for('login', function (Request $request) {
$throttleKey = Str::transliterate(Str::lower($request->input(Fortify::username())).'|'.$request->ip());
return Limit::perMinute(5)->by($throttleKey);
});
}
}